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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ALAN BOSWORTH SMITH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950640-CA
Priority No. 2

:

Although the state acknowledges in Appellee's Brief the
importance of evidentiary value, the state has failed to cite to
any part of the record establishing the identity of the garbage
bag contents and the value of the contents to a potential or
pending investigation or proceeding.

The lack of evidence

compels the determination that the judgment convicting
Defendant/Appellant Alan Smith ("Smith") of tampering with
evidence must be reversed.
POINT I. THE CHARGE OF TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE NEVER
SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE JURY SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO
PROVE A RELEVANT FACT.
The state has accused Smith of failing to marshal the
evidence supporting the jury's guilty verdict on the tampering
charge.

(Brief of Appellee, dated April 1, 1996 (hereinafter

"Appellee's Brief"), at 1, 8, and 10.)

That accusation

apparently is made to divert attention from the state's failure
at trial to prove a fact pertinent to the charge.

Where the

evidence is insufficient, the conviction cannot stand. See State
v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
1

Specifically, at trial the state failed to present evidence
concerning the garbage bag contents and failed to show that the
contents had evidentiary value -- that they were relevant to a
pending or potential investigation or proceeding.

Where no

evidence has been presented, no inference of evidentiary value
can be drawn.

See Krauss v. Utah St. Dept. of Trans., 852 P. 2d

1014, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (since trial evidence dispelled
existence of a critical factor, jury could not infer the opposite
conclusion), overruled on other grounds, Child v. Newsome, 892
P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995).

Thus, the trial court erred in

submitting the tampering charge to the jury. See State v. Harman,
767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (insufficient evidence warrants
dismissal); State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985); State v.
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985).
A.
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT DOES NOT PERMIT THE
MANUFACTURING OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT.
During trial and on appeal, the state has disregarded the
issue of evidentiary value to focus on "evidence" that "amply"
infers Smith's "intent" to commit the tampering offense.
(Appellee's Brief at 7-11.)

According to the state, "intent" was

inferred because,
1) [Smith failed] to report Barrett's death until after
he disposed of the paraphernalia; 2) [Smith disposed]
of the paraphernalia forty-five blocks from his home;
3) [he misled] the 911 operator [by suggesting] he had
reported the death as soon as he discovered it; 4) [he
lied] to both the 911 operator and the investigating
detective about drug involvement in Mr. Barrett's
death; and 5) [he admitted] to police that he removed
the paraphernalia so that the police would not find it
with Mr. Barrett's body.

2

(Appellee's Brief at 11 and 14.)

A review of the state's "ample"

"evidence" reflects the following:
One investigating officer identified by the state
testified that Smith used controlled substances on
February 20, 1995. (R. 601; Appellee's Brief at 5;1
see also Appellant's Brief at 11, note 2.)
Sometime during the morning of February 21, Smith
stated he believed Barrett had passed away.
(R. 531,
605; Appellee's Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.)
Thereafter, Othello Gerety ("Gerety") became hysterical
and requested that Smith take her to Project Reality at
700 South between 1st and 2nd East in Salt Lake City
for methadone. (R. 531-32, 666; Appellant's Brief at
7.) Rather than call 911, Smith took Gerety and Valerie
Mackert ("Mackert") to Project Reality.
(Appellee's
Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.)
Smith threw a garbage bag away at a convenience store
in the vicinity of the methadone clinic.
(Appellee's
Brief at 9; Appellant's Brief at 7.)
When Smith returned to his trailer at approximately
3:30 p.m. he called 911 to report Barrett's death.
(Appellee's Brief at 9; although the 911 tape was
played for the jury, it was not transcribed. A copy of
the transcript of the 911 call is attached hereto as an
Addendum.) The transcript reflects that when the
operator asked whether Barrett had overdosed, Smith was
sobbing and upset. He responded to the operator: "I
don't know. He came over here. I thought he was just
drunk."
(See attached Addendum at 6.) Nothing in the
record suggests Smith should have been able to diagnose
the cause of Barrett's death and determine for the 911
operator that Barrett had overdosed.
Additional "evidence" identified by the state is distorted.
According to the state, when Detective Deven Higgins
("Higgins") arrived at Smith's residence in response to
the 911 call, Smith stated to Higgins that "Barrett
drank too much, passed out, and never woke up (R. 486).
The condition of Mr. Barrett's body led the detective
to conclude that a drug overdose caused Mr. Barrett's
death; however, when he confronted defendant with his
conclusion, defendant denied any drug involvement (R.

1

The state has provided additional citations to the record that
do not support the proposition that Smith used controlled substances.
(See Appellee's Brief at 5 and citations to record set forth therein.)
3

487). " (Appellee's Brief at 10.) The state
conveniently has omitted the following emphasized
portions of Higgins' testimony:
According to Higgins, Smith told him that
"Barrett had come over to his house and had
been partying
and had drunk too much alcohol
and had passed out and had not woken up."
(R. 486.)
Higgins testified on direct examination that
(i) Smith denied "any drug involvement" (R.
487) and (ii) Smith maintained that position
in a written statement, identified as the
state's proposed Exhibit 4. (R. 487.)
On cross examination, Higgins was forced to
acknowledge that his testimony on direct
examination was incorrect. He admitted (i)
the written statement, Exhibit 4,
reflected
n
Barrett
did cocaine"
(R. 496), (ii) that

during questioning Smith did not deny

Barrett

used drucrs (R. 495-96) , and (iii) and that
Smith initially
told officers that Barrett
had been "partying" on February 20, 19 95.
Higgins acknowledged that term commonly

"refers

to the use of drugs."

(R. 497.)

According to the state, Detective Alex Huggard
("Huggard") testified that Smith "admitted" telling
Gerety and Mackert "to clean up the paraphernalia
because [Smith] did not want to explain it when the
police came and found Mr. Barrett's body
(R. 603-604,
609)."
(Appellee's Brief at 10.) In Appellee's Brief,
the state failed to disclose the following: Huggard
testified on direct examination that (i) he engaged in
two interviews with Smith (R. 599), (ii) the second
interview was tape-recorded (R. 599), and (iii) during
both interviews Smith allegedly made that same
"admission."
(R. 609 (Huggard testified that during
the second, recorded interview, Smith said "the same
thing, that he feared that [Barrett] might not make it,
and so that he had [Gerety] and [Mackert] pick up the
drug paraphernalia").) In addition, the state failed
to disclose that on cross-examination, Huggard was
forced to acknowledge that Smith did not make such an
"admission" during the second, recorded interview
(compare R. 609 with R. 612-14 and 631), and he
acknowledged that he could not recall with complete
accuracy the content of the first, unrecorded interview
with Smith. (R. 630-31.)

4

Given Huggard's and Higgins' testimony, the jury could not
have inferred intent as suggested by the state.

At most, the

jury could have believed Higgins and Huggard. In that instance,
the evidence reflects that (i) Smith did not deny to officers
that Barrett used drugs and (ii) Huggard acknowledged
inaccuracies in his testimony.

On the other hand, the jury could

have given their "testimony no weight, wholly disregarding [the]
testimony."

Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1022.

In that instance, the

jury "could not, by any rational process, have concluded that
[the] testimony was evidence" of Smith's intent.

Id.

However

the jury chose to resolve the matter, Higgins and Huggard both
acknowledged problems with their testimony; the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive on the issue of Smith's "intent."
Even if the inferences identified by the state support that
Smith had the requisite culpability to commit the offense of
tampering, as set forth in Appellant's Brief and below, the state
established only one element of the charge and wholly failed to
present evidence establishing (i) the identity of the garbage bag
contents as "paraphernalia" and (ii) the contents' evidentiary
value.

See State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 576 (Utah App. 1988).

B.
THE VERDICT CANNOT BE AFFIRMED WHERE THE EVIDENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT.
Rather than address the evidentiary issue, the state
launched into the following arguments and propositions:
In connection with a tampering charge, "[t]he critical
inquiry is what defendant believed, not whether the
state would need to rely on what he concealed to prove
facts in this or some other proceeding."
(Appellee's
Brief at 12.)
5

"The [tampering] statute does not require potential
investigations to ripen into actual investigations or
criminal actions against defendant."
(Id. at 13.)
Inadmissible evidence seized during a search can still
support a tampering charge. (Id. at 12 (citing State
v. Wacrstaff, 846 P. 2d 1311, 1311-12 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).)
The state's focus is misplaced.
1.
Only Part of the Inquiry Concerns "What Defendant
Believed;" Another Part of the Inquiry Is Whether the
State Presented Foundational Facts of Evidentiary
Value.
According to the state, the Utah tampering statute requires
the state to show "only that defendant removed or concealed
something to prevent its use in a potential investigation that
defendant believed would occur."

(Appellee's Brief at 12.)

The

state also asserts that the jury could infer that Smith
anticipated an investigation into Barrett's death "and concealed

evidence

relevant

to that

investigation,"

based on the fact that

Smith threw the garbage bag into a convenience store dumpster
before contacting authorities. (Appellee's Brief at 14 (emphasis
added).)

The state's argument breaks down at the point where the

state assumes the garbage bag contained "evidence relevant to
that investigation."

In fact, the state has failed to cite to

any portion of the record in support of such an assumption.2

2

The marshaled evidence reflects that Huggard's testimony is the
only evidence presented at trial concerning the garbage bag contents.
He testified that Smith had been after Gerety for some time prior to
February 20, 1995, to dispose of syringes in her possession and directed
her that evening to throw them away. (R. 613-14.) Thereafter, Gerety
and/or Mackert gave Smith a garbage bag. Huggard further testified that
on February 21, 1995, he took possession of a garbage bag from Smith and
(continued...)
6

An illustration of the importance of evidentiary value is in
order: The players are Victim, Suspect and Roommate.
owns a gun.
of it.

Roommate

Suspect has been after her for sometime to get rid

Victim and his friends go to a party at Suspect and

Roommate's home, and Victim brings his gun.

Victim shoots and

kills himself at Suspect's home with his gun.

Suspect is scared

z

(...continued)
"placed [into evidence] drug paraphernalia that we had found, the garbage
bag, etc." (R. 606-07, 640-41.) During the trial, when he was asked
about the garbage bag contents, Huggard stated the following:
[Huggard]
I would have to take out [the contents of the
garbage bag] and examine them. I recognize the bag, but I
don't know what the contents are.
Q [Question]

Okay.

[Huggard]
If I may look at them, I could give you a
clearer answer to that, sir.
Q [Question]

Okay. You don't know what this in total is?

[Huggard]
I do know what the exhibit is, it's a bag
that I've identified that I put into evidence, but I'd like to
look at the contents before I could tell you if that's -Q [Question]

Okay.

[Huggard]

What is there, sir.

Q [Question]
that?

All right.

[Huggard]

It appears to be the same.

Why don't you go ahead and do

Q [Question]
All right. And none of the -- the items in
this brown bag marked Exhibit 6 of the State, have ever been
analyzed for the presence of any drugs, controlled substances?
[Huggard]
(R. 638.)
svrincres

that

Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Significantly, the garbage bag contains neatly
avvear

to be unused.

(State's Exhibit 6.)

packaged

Given the lack

of evidence, and the failure to specifically identify the contents of the
bag as information relevant to an investigation or proceeding, the
reasonable inference is that Gerety and Mackert placed Gerety's unused
syringes in the garbage bag and gave them to Smith for disposal.
7

and believes officers will search his home as part of an
investigation relating to Victim's death.

Before calling

officers to the scene, Suspect again insists that Roommate get
rid of her gun.

Roommate hands a garbage bag to Suspect and

Suspect takes the bag to a dumpster downtown for disposal. When
officers are called to the home, they do not locate the gun that
killed Victim and they notice there is no garbage from the party.
They ask Suspect about the gun and the garbage, he goes downtown,
and he retrieves a garbage bag for officers.
with tampering with evidence.

Suspect is charged

At trial, the officers recognize

the bag and its contents as that which was retrieved from the
dumpster, but they never identify the contents of the garbage
bag.

In addition, they fail to testify with regard to the

evidentiary value of the garbage bag contents. In its case
against Suspect, is the state required to present foundational
facts concerning the garbage bag contents and connecting the
contents to a potential or pending investigation or proceeding?
Should Suspect be convicted on the lack of evidence?
In another illustration, State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 578
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the defendant was charged with assaulting a
police officer while in custody at the Salt Lake County jail.
During discovery, defendant learned that as part of standard
procedures, jail personnel made videotapes of bookings and
subsequently erased them after 72 hours if no one made a request
to retain them.

Based on that information, defendant moved to

dismiss the charge and asserted that jail personnel recorded the
8

alleged assault on videotape, the videotape was relevant to her
defense, and jail personnel erased the videotape.

The trial

court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, "for the reason
that the state failed to retain any videotape of the incident."
On appeal, this Court stated the following:
Although defense counsel claimed that the erased
videotape contained evidence material to the defense,
no evidence was presented that the video equipment was
operating in the booking area on the appropriate night
and either actually or most likely captured on tape the
alleged assault. Defendant thus failed to establish
the foundational fact of the existence of evidence.
Id.

Because the defendant in Jiminez failed to establish

evidentiary value, this Court reversed the dismissal.3
In this matter, although the state was in possession of the
garbage bag and its contents since February 21, 1995, the state
failed to elicit testimony, even from the officers, as to whether
the garbage bag contained used drug paraphernalia, items used by
Barrett, items used in Smith's trailer, or items relevant to a
potential or pending proceeding or investigation.

In fact, the

garbage bag contained a neat, clean package of unused syringes.
(See note 2, supra; State's Exhibit 6.)

3

Did officers contemplate

See also Gill v. State, 622 So.2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) ; State v. Murray, 349 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (in
connection with the charge of tampering with a witness, the alleged
victim must be or must have been a fact witness and the defendant must
know that the alleged victim was a fact witness) ; State v. Howe, 247
N.W.2d 647, 653 (N.D. 1976) (in considering the application of a witness
tampering statute: "All that is necessary is that the person be one who
knows or is supposed to know material facts and is expected to testify
to them or to be called on to testify") ; State v. Peck, 459 N.W.2d 441,
444 (S.D. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 513 F.2d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir.
1975) ("Indubitably, one is a witness, within the meaning of [the witness
tampering statute], when he knows or is supposed to know material facts,
and expectably is to be called to testify to them").
9

those contents in connection with some investigation or
proceeding, whether or not proceedings were instituted?
why did they fail to say as much at trial?4

If so,

Since the state

failed to make a showing of evidentiary value, it failed to
establish a critical factor.
The state has described in its brief the relevance of
"evidentiary value":

" [D]rug paraphernalia found at the same

location as a body showing signs consistent with a drug overdose
would provide additional circumstantial evidence as to the cause
of death.

Furthermore, drug paraphernalia would have had

evidentiary value for possible investigations into defendant's
drug use, defendant's presence during drug use, defendant
providing a place for drug use, and defendant's possession of
controlled substances or paraphernalia." (Appellee's Brief at
13.)

Because the state failed to identify the contents of the

garbage bag, the state has no basis for asserting that the unused
items would have had any such "value to the investigation." (Id.)
Since the evidence in this matter reflects that the garbage
bag contained apparently Gerety's unused syringes (see note 2,
supra), the "evidence" hardly provides officers with information
concerning Barrett's cause of death, drug use or drug possession
at Smith's trailer.

Unlike the issue of "intent", which usually

is not susceptible to direct proof and is often inferred from the

4

The state claims that "[t]he [tampering] statute does not require
potential investigations to ripen into actual investigations or criminal
actions against defendant" (Appellee's Brief at 13). That proposition
does not address the issue of evidentiary value.
10

circumstances,5 the issue of evidentiary value in this matter
could be presented only by the state and was susceptible to
direct proof.

The state had exclusive control and possession of

the garbage bag contents since February 21, 1995, the state's
officers could testify to the actual contents of the garbage bag,
and the state's officers could testify to the relevance of such
contents in a potential or pending investigation or proceeding.
Since the state failed to present foundational facts of
evidentiary value, the conviction must be reversed. See State v.
Wooden, 619 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

» [T]here is

no indication" that the garbage bag was further "subject to
identification and thus its value as evidence is highly
questionable."

Radar v. State, 420 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1982).
2.
The "Admissibility" of Evidence and "Evidentiary
Value" Are Distinct and Separate Concepts.
Smith does not dispute that inadmissible evidence may
support a tampering charge.

In State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at

1311, authorities observed drug paraphernalia in a plastic bag in
plain view, arrested and handcuffed Wagstaff in connection with
the observed baggy, and observed Wagstaff place the baggy in his
mouth and chew on it.

Wagstaff was charged with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance and tampering with evidence,

5

State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985)) ("intent need not be
proved by direct evidence, buy may be inferred from defendant's conduct
and surrounding circumstances").
11

and later with interfering with an arresting officer.
1312.

Id. at

Although the admissibility of the drug paraphernalia was

an issue in that case, the parties did not raise the issue of
evidentiary value.6

In this matter, the evidentiary value of

the garbage bag contents was not established.
C.
PURPOSE AND BELIEF CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED WITH
MISREPRESENTED AND MISSING FACTS AND INFERENCES.
The state asserts that the evidence establishes or infers
that Smith believed an investigation or proceeding would be
conducted by authorities and Smith acted with purpose to make
"the drug paraphernalia" unavailable to authorities.
Brief at 13-14.)

(Appellee's

In support of those assertions, the state

references the same facts and inferences attributed to Appellee's
Brief above, which facts and inferences are not supported by the
evidence.
In addition, because the state failed to establish the
identity of the garbage bag contents, the evidence cannot support
that Smith "had the purpose to make the
unavailable."

drug

paraphernalia

Since the garbage bag contained Gerety's unused

syringes (see note 2, supra), neither purpose nor belief can be
inferred.
Although the jury rendered a verdict of guilty in this
matter, such a verdict does not assume that the actual and

6

The evidentiary value in that case is clear. The officers
identified the contents of the baggy as a controlled substance; the
controlled substance was linked to an investigation and charges against
Wagstaff for unlawful possession.
12

circumstantial facts were sufficiently established.

Indeed,

guilty verdicts are reversed where the lack of evidence
undermines them.

See State v. Salasf 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct.

App. 1991) (jury's conviction of defendant on charge of
possession of controlled substance was reversed where evidence
failed to establish nexus between defendant and controlled
substance).

The marshaled evidence in this case cannot save the

state's failure to establish through actual or circumstantial
evidence the evidentiary value of the garbage bag contents.
POINT II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT FOR JOINING THE CHARGES
IS SUPPORTED BY FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.
The crux of the state's argument concerning severance of the
charges is that the "trial court properly exercised its
discretion to leave the charges joined because it could have
admitted evidence of each [charge] in separate trials for the
other."

(Appellee's Brief at 16.) 7 In support of that notion,

7

The state incorrectly asserts that "on appeal, defendant limits
his argument to the manslaughter and evidence tampering charges."
(Appellee's Brief at 16.) A cursory review of Smith's opening brief
reflects that Smith has urged severance of the three charged offenses:
"Since the charges of homicide, failing to report the finding
of a dead body, and tampering with evidence in this matter did
not occur under 'identical' circumstances, the 'same conduct'
language of the statute is inapplicable."
"[I]n this matter the State failed to demonstrate how
Barrett's death, the alleged failure to report the finding of
a dead body, and the garbage that Smith retrieved for
authorities from the dumpster were connected.
Since the
events have not been linked together, it was error for the
trial court to refuse to sever the charges."
"[T]he record contains no evidence to support the notion that
Smith was motivated by a single objective to commit the
(continued...)
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the state presupposes that real or circumstantial evidence
connecting the garbage bag contents to the events of February 20,
1995, was presented at trial:
"Evidence that Mr. Barrett died from a drug overdose at
defendant's party, and that defendant summoned no
medical aid when Mr. Barrett first collapsed
established a motive for defendant to make evidence
of
drug- use unavailable . . . " ;
"Evidence of the manslaughter also provided a basis for
the jury to infer that defendant
threw away the
paraphernalia
. . . ";
"Evidence that defendant recklessly caused Mr.
Barrett's death. . . would allow the jury to infer. . .
that [Smith] intended to make circumstantial evidence

of his involvement with what caused Mr. Barrett's
unavailable
in that
investigation";

death

"suspicion of an overdose led [police] to question
defendant about drug use, which in turn led to the
discovery of the drug paraphernalia:
the police
witnesses could not explain the events leading to
discovery of the drug paraphernalia
without testifying
about what caused Mr. Barrett's death."
(Appellee's Brief at 16-24 (emphasis added).)

Because the state

failed to present evidence that the garbage bag contained "drug
paraphernalia" or the instrument that "caused Mr. Barrett's

(...continued)
alleged offenses. An objective review of the record reflects
just the opposite as argued by the State: according to the
prosecutor, Smith allegedly committed homicide to avoid being
implicated in the 'risks' of drug use in his home, R. 759,
785; Smith allegedly committed the offense of failing to
report a dead body for selfish reasons --so that he could 'go
out and do other things', R. 761; Smith allegedly committed
the offense of tampering with evidence ' in anticipation of the
police coming [over] with the death of Mr. Barrett' . R. 759,
788. By the State's own admissions, Smith was not motivated
by the same objective to complete the alleged offenses."
(Appellant's Brief at 23, 24, 30-31 (emphasis added).) Inasmuch as the
state has failed to address severing the charge of tampering from the
charge of failing to report a dead body, the judgment in this case should
be reversed on that basis.
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death," the state's argument fails (see Point I, supra).

Without

specifically identifying the garbage bag contents as used drug
paraphernalia or instruments relevant to the events of February
20, 1995, the jury had no basis for inferring motive or intent
under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,8 particularly since
the bag contained unused syringes. (See note 2, supra.)
With respect to Rule 403, it cautions against the
prejudicial effect of admitting evidence relating to separate
charges.

The trial judge's post-trial statements accentuate the

dangers:
Now, you have this homicide part of the trial, the
manslaughter part of the trial in there where Mr. Smith
did not inject the drugs. [He] provided the home.
[He] did not call 9-1-1, did not do anything other than
let [Barrett] sleep the night, thinking [Barrett] was
coming out of his overdose and then found him dead in
the morning.
Now, he -- with that part in the trial, it seems to me
that the jury could well have thought, well, look, if we
take [the homicide] part out, we can convict him of the
failure to report and of the tampering with evidence.
•

*

*

Well, this is a -- I will tell you, this has been a
major difficulty for me to deal with, because I will say
that it is my belief that there was -- that the jury was
correct by not convicting [Smith] on the manslaughter
[charge] and that the manslaughter charge overrode all of
the rest of the case.
(R. 833, 841.)

In addition, the trial judge disclosed a letter

to the court from a jury member who suffered "buyer's remorse."
The juror disclosed that by convicting Smith of tampering and

8

Rule 404(b) precludes the introduction of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts unless the evidence shows motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident.
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failing to report a dead body, the jury had committed an
injustice.

(R. 832-33.)

The trial judge apparently agreed with

the juror, and stated the following:
I have some serious problems in this case, and if this
case were tried just as a tampering case, I'd feel
different about it; or if it were tried just as a
failure to report a dead body. But the juror basically
says that his will was overridden by other jurors.
Now, that's okay, that happens in jury rooms; but this
case, I will tell you, is one that has [given] me some
very serious pause.
(R. 834-35. ) 9

Then the trial judge stated, "it will be the

decision of this Court that the motion
trial

shall

be granted.

of

the

defense

for

a new

. . I do believe that Mr. Smith should be

tried on the charge of tampering with evidence.

Well, I don't

know, I'm going to think about this for a minute before I render
a ruling."

(Id. (emphasis added).)

Thereafter, the trial court

reversed itself, denied the motion for a new trial, and sentenced
Smith to incarceration, a fine, a surcharge, and recoupment fees.
(R. 846.)
Smith is asking this Court to reinstate the trial court's
original ruling: reverse the conviction and provide Smith with a
new trial since the evidence relating to the charges of
manslaughter and failing to report a dead body sacrificed Smith's
right to a fundamentally fair trial.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 77-

8a-l(4) (a) (1995) (charges must be severed if defendant "is
prejudiced by a joinder"); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 116-17

9

The trial court ultimately granted Smith's motion to dismiss the
charge of failing to report a dead body after the jury rendered a guilty
verdict on that charge. (R. 845-46.)
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(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
POINT III. THE STATE'S ADMISSIONS CONCERNING GERETY'S
HEARSAY TESTIMONY COMPEL THE DETERMINATION THAT THE
TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE TO THE JURY.
A. THE STATE ASSERTS THAT GERETY'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT
RELEVANT TO THE TAMPERING CHARGE; THUS, IT SERVED ONLY
TO PREJUDICE SMITH.
The state initially argued in the severance portion of its
brief that "the facts supporting the tampering charge were too
intertwined with those supporting the manslaughter charge" to
warrant severance of the charges.

(Appellee's Brief at 20.)

The

state subsequently argued in support of admitting Gerety's
hearsay statements into evidence that her prior statements were
"mostly relevant to the State's manslaughter theory" -- and
apparently not so "intertwined."

(Appellee's Brief at 27.)

While the state apparently has retreated from its earlier
position, one truth is clear: The overwhelming evidence at trial
implicating Smith in criminal conduct was presented in the form
of hearsay testimony.10

In addition, the prosecutor made

numerous references before the jury to Gerety's testimony in an

10

In fact, in Appellee's Brief the state has cited almost
exclusively to the hearsay testimony of Gerety, Higgins and Huggard to
support inferences allegedly implicating Smith in criminal conduct.
(Higgins' testimony: R. 482-519, 615-625, 690-696; Huggard's testimony:
R. 597-614, 629-50; Gerety's testimony: R. 654-690.) As stated herein
and in Appellant's Brief, the trial court should have excluded Gerety's
out-of-court statements. In addition, as set forth in Point I of the
Argument, supra, since Higgins and Huggard acknowledged misstatements in
their testimony, if the jury believed them, the evidence reflects that
the testimony is incomplete and inconsistent. On the other hand, if the
jury disbelieved Higgins' and Huggard's testimony, it should not have
given the testimony weight, and should have disregarded it. Krauss, 852
P. 2d at 1022. However the jury chose to resolve the credibility issues
surrounding Higgins and Huggard, the evidence was inconclusive.
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effort to implicate Smith in a parade of horrors on February 20
and 21, 1995.

(See R. at 759-768; 784-791.)

If Gerety's

testimony was so irrelevant to the tampering charge as the state
asserts, the charges should have been severed, or in the
alternative, the hearsay testimony should not have been admitted
in connection with the tampering charge.
B. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT OFFICIALS PUT LITTLE
EFFORT INTO LOCATING GERETY.
In further considering Gerety's hearsay testimony in this
matter, the state acknowledges the following: (1) officers knew
Gerety suffered health problems but checked only two area
hospitals; (2) officers knew Gerety did not have a permanent
address but made no inquiries and conducted no searches outside
the downtown Salt Lake area; and (3) officers waited until less
than three weeks before trial to begin their search, yet they had
taken a full three weeks to locate Gerety in connection with
serving an arrest warrant on her.

(Appellee's Brief at 25-26.)

In addition, the state suggests it was Smith's burden to show
that Gerety was available (Appellee's Brief at 27 ("Significantly, defendant, Ms. Gerety's former boyfriend, did not offer any
information about Ms. Gerety's whereabouts or make any showing
that the State could have found her if it had looked harder"),
and attempts to excuse its dilatory conduct by asserting,
"hindsight may suggest additional, desirable measures but does
not establish [an abuse of discretion]."
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(Id.)

Since the state sought to offer the hearsay testimony into
evidence in lieu of the witness, it was the state's burden to
prove Gerety's unavailability.

State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990).

That

burden is not shifted to the defense to show "availability," as
the state suggests.
With regard to the state's reference to "hindsight," at the
time the officers launched into their late search of Gerety, they
had the benefit of Utah Supreme Court precedent identifying the
"additional, desirable measures."

See State v. Webb, 779 P.2d

1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1989) ("Every reasonable effort must be made
to produce the witness"); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540
(Utah 1981) (in locating a witness, the court identified
searching bus terminals and using out-of-state police); State v.
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982) (in locating a witness, the
court expressed a preference for using the Uniform Act to Secure
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings); State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645 (Utah 1995) (in
locating a witness, the court recognized the use of federal
agencies, U.S. Marshals and investigators). In addition, in this
matter, officers could draw on their own past experiences.
Again, they knew from past experience (i) they would need at
least three weeks to find Gerety, (ii) she had health problems
and numerous hospitals are located in the Salt Lake Valley, and
(iii) she did not have a permanent residence and numerous
agencies could be explored, including federal and transportation
19

agencies.

The officers and state simply opted to disregard the

additional desirable measures.
The state's presentation of Gerety's hearsay testimony was
prejudicial to Smith and an abuse of discretion.
substantially to the verdict.

It contributed

Other evidence incriminating Smith

came from the officers, who admitted during trial that they could
not accurately and fully recall the content of hearsay statements
made by Smith.

(See Argument, Point I.A., supra.)

They also

admitted during trial that they failed to accurately and
completely recount Smith's statements.

(Id.)

Gerety's hearsay

testimony is the strongest evidence implicating Smith in drug use
on February 20, 1995, Barrett's death and other conduct. Those
witnesses who were at Smith's trailer on February 20, 1995,
contradicted Gerety's hearsay testimony, underscoring the
importance of (i) providing the defendant with the right to
confront such a witness as Gerety, and (ii) allowing the jury to
assess the witness's credibility and demeanor.

Since the trial

court permitted the state to present the hearsay testimony, the
trial court took an important function away from the jury and
denied Smith his right to confront a critical witness.
CONCLUSION
Smith respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing
the conviction against him on the grounds of insufficient
evidence.

In the alternative, Smith respectfully requests the

entry of an order vacating the judgment and conviction against
him and remanding the case for a new trial on the tampering
20

charge only, without the admission into evidence of Gerety's
hearsay testimony.
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ADDENDUM A

STATE V. SMITH
911 CALL
FEBRUARY 21, 1995
OPERATOR:

911.

SMITH:

Yes.

OPERATOR:

Uh hum (affirmative).

SMITH:

A friend of mine stayed here last night, and I just
came home. I've been gone all morning. And I think
he's dead. I don't know what's wrong with him.
He's, he's like, there's stuff coming out of his
nose. He, he don't look good.

OPERATOR:

Is he breathing?

SMITH:

I don't think so.

OPERATOR:

Can you check, to see if you see his chest rising
for me?

SMITH:

His chest isn't rising.

OPERATOR:

It is not?

SMITH:

And I pressed on him.

OPERATOR:

Uh hum.

SMITH:

There's like foam coming out of his nose.

OPERATOR:

Uh hum.

SMITH:

And when I pressed on him, it just made foam, more
foam come out.

OPERATOR:

Uh huh.

SMITH:

Can you send someone, please, fast.

OPERATOR:

Yeh, we will.
at all?

SMITH:

I don't.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

No.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

I just got home.

I'm at 225 Biltmore Avenue.

I checked.

So you don't, you don't--

You don't see any breath coming out

There's nothing.

And you don't know how long it's been?
I've been gone since I, about eleven o'clock.
How old is he?

SMITH:

Uh, around 22, 23 years old.

OPERATOR:

Twenty-three ?

SMITH:

Twenty-three or something like that.
go out with his mom.

OPERATOR:

Uh hum.

SMITH:

I mean, you know, he comes over last night.
over. And he was drunk.

OPERATOR:

Yah.

SMITH:

And I put him to bed.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

And I thought everything was okay. In fact, when I
left this morning about eleven o'clock, I opened the
door and everything, you know, he looked fine. He
had a smile on his face. I thought he was fine.

OPERATOR:

Is he blue?

SMITH:

I, it's hard to tell.

OPERATOR:

So like there's foam coming out of his mouth?

SMITH:

There's foam coming out of his nostrils.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

(inaudible)

OPERATOR:

You what?

SMITH:

I (inaudible).

OPERATOR:

I, I already did
_, sir, and I'm going to
keep you on the phone to get some more information.
Okay?

SMITH:

Okay.

OPERATOR:

I've already sent
apartment or a--

SMITH:

It's a, a--

OPERATOR:

It's a home?

I, I used to

He came

He's a Mexican kid.

Can you please send somebody over?

to your home.
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Is this an

SMITH:

A trailer.

OPERATOR:

It's a trailer.
park?

SMITH:

Cottonwood Cove.

OPERATOR:

Cottonwood Cove?

SMITH:

I don't know the lot number, but it's, my address is
225 Biltmore.

OPERATOR:

So do you think that's your lot number?

SMITH:

No, I think my lot number's something different.
But if they, when they come into Cottonwood Cove--

OPERATOR:

Okay. Hold on a minute. Let me tell me that you
don't know your lot number.

SMITH:

And I have it written down on one of my rent
receipts or something, I'm sure, but--

OPERATOR:

Okay. Now can you give me directions how to get in
there?

SMITH:

Okay.

OPERATOR:

Uh hah.

SMITH:

And then go over a bridge--

OPERATOR:

Enter park.

SMITH:

And make the first right.

OPERATOR:

Okay.
Okay.

SMITH:

First right and second left. Called Biltmore,
at 225 Biltmore. Please send somebody quick.

OPERATOR:

I've already sent them, sir. I'll need to keep you
on the phone now. Okay? Second right, or second
left, right?

SMITH:

Yeh, the second left.

OPERATOR:

First right, then left.

SMITH:

Go over the bridge, first right--

What the name of your mobile home

What's your lot number?

See, you come in the park--

Wait, hold on a sec,
And then turn right
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Go over the bridge.
I'm

OPERATOR:

And then left, right?

SMITH:

Second left.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

Second left.

OPERATOR:

So you seen him last night and he was drinking?

SMITH:

Yeh, well, he came over last night.

OPERATOR:

Uh huh.

SMITH:

And he passed out on my couch. So I put him to bed,
you know, and, and last I checked on him, he was
snoring away, you know.

OPERATOR:

Do you want to try CPR?

SMITH:

I, and I mean--

OPERATOR:

Do you want to try CPR?

SMITH:

I mean, he's stiff.

OPERATOR:

Oh, he's stiff?

SMITH:

I went in there and just touched him (inaudible).

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

I mean, when I, when I opened the door and I seen
that, I seen this white shine on his nose. So I
went over and touched him, and the man's dead.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

Yeh.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

And I've been gone for a few hours. I had to take
my, my girlfriend's on
acilin.

OPERATOR:

When was the last time you seen him alive--last
night or this morning?

SMITH:

Yeh. About, well, about midnight, it's when I went
to bed.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

And he's about 23, you say?

SMITH:

Midnight or two o'clock. And, and I checked on him
before I went to bed, and he was breathing and
snoring. As a matter of fact, he was snoring up a
storm. I thought that he was fine.

OPERATOR:

Uh hum.

SMITH:

I mean, you know, 'cause
did, I just, you know, I
we put him to bed and he
storm, so I thought that

OPERATOR:

Uh hum.

SMITH:

I mean, he did drink a couple of days ago.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

I mean, he came over and he passed out right on my
floor, you know. And everybody was dancing around
and, you know, most of the night. And so, last
night, I really didn't say anything. I just, he
came over with a couple of guys.

OPERATOR:

Where he's at now?

SMITH:

He's in my room, my spare bedroom.

OPERATOR:

So is he on the bed, like he just kind of passed out
and stayed there, huh?

SMITH:

Yah.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

But he isn't fine anymore.

OPERATOR:

What's your last name, sir?

SMITH:

My name is Smith.

OPERATOR:

And your first name?

SMITH:

Alan, A-L-A-N.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

265-2625.

OPERATOR:

Okay. We've got a
keep you on the phone.
your home?

when he passed out like he
was worried about him. And
was just snoring up a
he was fine.

I mean, he was fine.

And your phone number there?
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. We're just going to
Do you have any animals in

SMITH:

No.

They all died, too.

OPERATOR:

Anybody else there with you?

SMITH:

Yeh.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

He's

OPERATOR:

What?

SMITH:

(sobbing) He's dead.

OPERATOR:

Okay.

SMITH:

She just barely looked at him.

OPERATOR:

She's checking him?

SMITH:

She, he's dead.

OPERATOR:

What did she say?

SMITH:

She said, "He's gone."

OPERATOR:

Do you think he overdosed on something, or--

SMITH:

I don't know.
just drunk.

OPERATOR:

Does he do drugs at all, that you're aware of?

SMITH:

Uh, Uh, I don't know, I don't know.

OPERATOR:

Well, he could have, I don't know, it could have
been a number of things, I guess.

SMITH:

I don't know. He came, he came, he came over here.
He's in there. They're here.

My friend Valerie.
stiff.
.

Oh, my God!

He came over here.

I thought he was

(crying in background)
OPERATOR:

Hello.

(pause)

SMITH:

(crying in background)

OPERATOR:

Hello.

(pause)

Hello.

Hello.

END OF CONVERSATION
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(pause)

Are you there?

Oh, no!
(pause)

Hello.

